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ARTICLE 
 
Preserving the Public Interest  
Through the Use of  
Alternative Dispute Resolution in  
Utility Retail Rate Cases 
JAMES M. VAN NOSTRAND* AND ERIN P. HONAKER** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Utility general rate cases are lengthy, expensive and often-
contentious proceedings, litigated over a period of nearly a year.  
Several dozen issues are typically in dispute, ranging from the 
allowed overall rate of return—which can be worth tens of 
millions of dollars—to minor operating expenses such as the 
recoverability in rates of a utility’s decision to have its chief 
executive fly to a meeting on a chartered flight instead of a 
commercial flight.  While this may be worth only a few hundred 
dollars to ratepayers, it can often be of greater value to the 
opponents of a rate increase in shaping public opinion.  Given the 
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degree in economics from the University of Northern Iowa. 
** Ms. Honaker is expected to graduate from Pace Law School in 2010 with a 
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hundreds of thousands of dollars that can be devoted by the 
utility to litigating these cases—which is likely recoverable in 
rates of utility customers as legitimate operating expenses of the 
utility—and the hundreds of thousands of dollars of public 
resources that similarly are spent in scrutinizing and challenging 
the utility’s case by the advocacy staff of the public utility 
commissions, there is a strong interest amongst state public 
utility commissions (PUCs) and litigants in encouraging 
settlement of these cases.  In particular, if these cases can be 
resolved in the early stages of the process, substantial litigation 
costs can be avoided.  Moreover, the litigants (and their 
constituents) can benefit from the certainty of a settled (versus 
litigated) outcome and the improved relationships among the 
litigating parties associated with an outcome achieved through 
settlement. 
This article will explore the measures that PUCs can take to 
encourage settlement of utility rate proceedings.  To provide a 
context for this examination, we will discuss the schedule and 
process typically followed in the utility retail rate-setting process.  
We will consider the formal steps a regulatory agency can take to 
create an environment that will promote settlement of utility 
rate-setting proceedings, such as the adoption of procedural rules 
governing the settlement process.  Just as importantly, the 
regulatory agency can take less formal steps to promote 
settlement, such as making a settlement judge or a mediation 
process available to the litigants, or including a settlement 
conference as part of the procedural schedule.  We will then 
examine some of the practical considerations of the settlement 
process, such as the most opportune time for scheduling a 
settlement conference in the procedural schedule.  We will also 
consider some of the fairness considerations of the settlement 
process, such as ensuring that any non-settling parties have an 
adequate opportunity to challenge a settlement and present a 
case in opposition to a proposed settlement.  Finally, we will 
examine how these concepts and practices may be applied more 
broadly to proceedings other than the utility rate-setting process. 
II.  UTILITY RETAIL RATE PROCEEDINGS 
Utility retail rate cases are proceedings in which a regulated, 
investor-owned utility (electric, natural gas, water, or 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/7
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telecommunications) files for a proposed rate change, and the 
state PUC conducts an investigation over several months1 to 
determine whether all or a portion of the rate request should be 
approved.  The initial utility filing includes pre-filed direct 
testimony and accompanying exhibits in which the utility 
explains the basis for its requested rate relief and justifies the 
various elements of its filing, including operating expenses, 
proposed capital investments, and the level of equity return it is 
seeking.  The initial filing must also include work papers that 
provide detailed numerical calculations supporting the rate 
request and any cost or economic studies necessary to follow the 
derivation of the various elements of the rate filing.  The filing 
also includes proposed tariff sheets that reflect the specific rate 
changes that the utility seeks to make. 
For the several months following the initial filing, the PUC 
trial advocacy staff (Staff) and other intervenors in the 
proceeding (typically customer groups representing industrial, 
residential, and small commercial customers; individual large 
customers; environmental and public interest consumer groups) 
conduct extensive discovery regarding the utility’s filing.  This 
discovery process allows parties to explore the basis for the 
utility’s rate request and gather the necessary data and 
information to challenge portions of the utility’s filing or propose 
positions on issues other than those offered by the utility through 
the issuance of data requests, interrogatory requests or requests 
for production (among other things).  Discovery can also include 
the deposition of witnesses filing testimony on behalf of the 
utility.  Some PUCs provide for an informal discovery process 
achieved through technical conference or informal discovery 
conferences where the utility’s witnesses can be questioned 
informally and off-the-record by the other parties in the 
proceeding.   
 
 1. The period over which the utility rate case must be processed is 
determined by the applicable statutory suspension period in each state. In New 
York, for example, the New York Public Service Commission must issue a final 
order determining the outcome of a general rate filing no later than six months 
after the utility submits its initial filing. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(12)(f) 
(McKinney 2009). Washington also has an eleven-month suspension period. 
WASH. REV. CODE. § 80.04.110(3) (2009). In contrast Oregon has a ten-month 
suspension period. OR. REV. STAT. § 757.215(1) (2009). 
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Following discovery of the utility’s initial filing, Staff and 
other intervenors submit opposing cases.2  Staff is generally 
charged with representing the public interest and files a case that 
takes a position on most of the issues raised in the utility’s filing.  
The other intervenor groups generally file more limited testimony 
that addresses only those issues of particular interest to that 
party.  After the filing of the opposing cases, the utility is given 
an opportunity to conduct discovery on the cases filed by PUC 
Staff and the intervenors.  Thereafter, the utility files rebuttal 
testimony that addresses and responds to the issues raised in 
both the Staff and intervenor testimony.  Depending upon the 
number of issues raised in the opposing testimony, the utility’s 
rebuttal case may be even more extensive than its direct case.  
The filing of the utility’s rebuttal case is followed by a sufficient 
period for the opposing parties to conduct necessary discovery, 
which is followed by an evidentiary hearing. 
The hearing is conducted before the commissioners or an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), at the PUC. During the 
hearings, the witnesses who offered pre-filed testimony are cross-
examined under oath and the testimony and exhibits are 
 
 2. See, e.g., Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., No. 
UE-090704, UG-090705, Order No. 04, Prehearing Conference Order (Wash. 
Util. & Transp. Comm’n June 24, 2009) (consolidated), available at http://www. 
wutc.wa.gov/rms2.nsf/177d98baa5918c7388256a550064a61e/938e6f122cd8b9158
82575df006f44e1!OpenDocument. This order illustrates the timing of different 
phases of the process: 
 
Event Date Interval (Days) 
Issue Discussion / Settlement Conference October 23, 2009  
Public Comment Hearing TBD  
Staff, Public Counsel & Intervenor 
Response Testimony & Exhibits 
November 17, 2009 193 
Company Rebuttal Testimony & Exhibits; 
Staff, Public Counsel and Intervenor 
Cross-Answering Testimony & Exhibits 
December 17, 2009 30 
Settlement Conference between Parties January 5-6, 2010  
Evidentiary Hearing January 19-22 & 25, 
2010 
33 
Initial Briefs February 19, 2010 25 
Reply Briefs March 2, 2010 11 
Suspension Date April 7, 2010 36 
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admitted into the evidentiary record.  Depending upon the 
number of issues remaining in dispute at the hearing stage and 
the extent of cross-examination, the evidentiary hearings may 
take two to three weeks.  The hearing is followed by initial and 
reply briefs.  Several weeks are typically allowed in the 
procedural schedule to accommodate deliberation by the 
commissioners, as well as preparation of the final order.  Dozens 
of issues may remain in dispute after the conclusion of the 
hearings, and each disputed issue must be resolved by the PUC 
on the basis of the evidence, the parties’ arguments, the 
applicable legal standards, and PUC precedent.  The 
deliberations can be very time consuming and may need to be 
conducted in open session if required by the state’s open meeting 
law. 
After deliberation and consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the evidentiary record,3 the PUC issues its order granting, 
granting in part, or denying the utility’s rate request.  Thereafter, 
the utility makes a compliance filing in which it submits tariff 
sheets reflecting the amount of rate relief granted by the PUC.  
Post-order remedies include seeking reconsideration by the PUC 
of its order, as well as judicial review to state courts.  As a 
general matter, it is relatively difficult to overturn a PUC 
decision on judicial review.  Substantial deference is afforded to 
the administrative agency with expertise on the complexities of 
the ratemaking process and the standards of review typically 
require reversal only when the PUC findings are: (1) arbitrary 
and capricious;4 or (2) not supported by substantial evidence.5 
A fully litigated case, one in which few (if any) of the issues 
are resolved through settlement, is thus a very expensive and 
time-consuming process.  Depending upon the number of issues 
 
 3. In some states, an initial decision (or recommended decision) is rendered 
by an ALJ and parties file a round of briefs to the commissioners on “exceptions” 
in which they “except” to those determinations of the ALJ with which they 
disagree. This additional round of briefing is required to occur within the 
statutory suspension period, which results in the earlier stages of the procedural 
schedule occurring earlier than in those jurisdictions in which an initial decision 
by an ALJ is not used. 
 4. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(i) (2009) (relating to 
Washington State Administrative Procedures). 
 5. See, e.g., id. § 34.05.570(3)(e) (relating to Washington State 
Administrative Procedures). 
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involved, utility representation will typically require between 
three and five attorneys.  If the utility is represented by an 
outside law firm, rather than staffing the case with in-house 
counsel, the fees paid by energy utilities for representation in a 
general rate proceeding can easily reach a range of one to two 
million dollars.  In addition, the utility will incur expert witness 
fees, usually for a cost of capital witness and occasionally for 
complex ratemaking issues such as cost of service and rate 
design.  PUC Staff will be required to devote several lawyers and 
accountants, engineers and economists to the effort, and will also 
generally incur expert witness fees for cost of capital issues.  The 
costs incurred by intervenor parties depend upon the extent of 
their case and the number of issues they choose to address 
through testimony.  A limited intervenor case with one to two 
lawyers and two to three expert witnesses can be expected to cost 
between a half-million to a million dollars.  In addition to these 
expenses, there is substantial personnel time devoted to the 
effort, particularly preparing responses to discovery requests, 
witness preparation for the hearings, the weeks spent in the 
hearing room, and the drafting of briefs. 
The expense can be substantially reduced if the number of 
issues litigated can be reduced through settlement.  Moreover, 
the time can be shortened considerably if the entire case can be 
resolved through settlement, which can result in an abbreviated 
schedule and an earlier decision date by the PUC.  Narrowing or 
resolving all issues through settlement also reduces the 
uncertainty associated with having the case resolved by the PUC 
and can promote better working relationships among the parties.  
Given the advantages associated with settlements in utility rate 
cases, PUCs may wish to consider taking a number of steps to 
promote settlement, or at least to create an environment in which 
settlements can occur.  These steps can include both formal 
actions, such as enacting or amending procedural rules to include 
rules that specifically address alternative dispute resolution and 
informal actions, such as including settlement hearings in the 
procedural schedule and making settlement judges available to 
the parties to facilitate settlement.  The next two sections of the 
article address these items. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/7
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III.  FORMAL AGENCY ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE 
SETTLEMENT 
To create a structure in which settlement may occur, an 
administrative agency will need to ensure that its procedural 
rules address the process for resolving proceedings through 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).  Generally, ADR is defined 
very broadly to include any mechanism to resolve disagreements 
without resorting to contested hearings. ADR includes 
mediations, collaborations, settlement conferences, and any 
combination of these processes.  Ideally, the agency’s procedural 
rules should address the various options available for resolving 
disputes through ADR, and include some parameters for parties 
seeking to use these processes. 
A. The Process Followed in Washington State 
In 1997, the Governor of Washington, Gary Locke, mandated 
regulatory improvement by state agencies “to improve the 
effectiveness and fairness of [the state’s] regulatory processes.”6  
In doing so, the Governor recognized the importance of 
stakeholder involvement, inter-agency cooperation, and fairness 
of procedure.7  The rulemaking process was to be achieved 
through public involvement, specifically recognizing the need to 
partner with non-profit organizations, environmental groups, 
municipalities, and businesses.8  Creating alternative processes to 
increase efficiency and effectiveness while achieving the same 
regulatory objectives were to be considered in amending the 
rules, as well as analyzing costs and benefits.9  In response to this 
executive order, the Washington Utilities and Transportation 
Commission (WUTC) reformed the agency’s procedural rules 
 
 6. Wash. Exec. Order No. 97-02 (Mar. 25, 1997), available at http://www.gov 
ernor.wa.gov/execorders/eoarchive/eo_97-02.htm. 
 7. Id.  The other major goals of the regulatory amendments were clarifying 
procedural rules through structural changes and creating a more efficient 
process. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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regarding the use of ADR.10  These provisions will be discussed 
within the specific context of rate-filing procedures. 
The public interest is advanced by the Commission’s 
encouragement of settlements in the rate-setting process not only 
through the result of a speedier and less-costly process,11 but also 
because an agreed-upon settlement, by its very nature, satisfies 
more parties than a win-lose adjudicatory decision.  The public 
(represented by the Attorney General’s Office), the utility, and 
the intervenors have a better chance of being satisfied when cases 
are settled as opposed to litigated, because the outcome is 
determined by the parties as opposed to a decision-making body 
(in this case, the three commissioners of the WUTC). 
In May 2001, the WUTC initiated a rulemaking process to 
completely revise its procedural rules.12  The Administrative Law 
Department had already begun to discuss necessary 
modifications in the procedural process with private practitioners 
who appeared before the Commission, State Attorneys General 
who represented the Commission in proceedings, and other 
attorneys in the state.13  By the time the rulemaking process was 
formally commenced, the decision-makers and staff members at 
the WUTC14 were also consulted for their suggestions regarding 
the revisions.  The rulemaking process occurred over a two-and-a-
half year period, resulting in a revised set of WUTC procedural 
 
 10. WASH. UTIL. & TRANSP. COMM’N, GEN. ORDER NO. R-510 at 3 (Dec. 3, 
2003), available at http://www.wutc.wa.gov/rms2.nsf/177d98baa5918c7388256a 
550064a61e/ad83266f59cebb3088256df1005862d0!OpenDocument (noting that 
other procedural aspects were amended, repealed and adopted in compliance 
with the Executive Order; however, only the ADR rules are relevant to this 
article). Specifically, §§ 480-09-460–467 were repealed and Part III, governing 
adjudicative proceedings, was adopted, including Subpart D on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. WASH. UTIL. & TRANSP. COMM’N, RULEMAKING: CHAPTER 480-09 WAC—
PROCEDURE, No. A-010648 (May 30, 2001), available at http://www.wutc.wa.gov/ 
rms2.nsf/vw2005OpenDocket/BFCFBA529122F48708256B80000F735D. 
 13. Id. at 1. 
 14. Decision-makers at the WUTC at the time included Chairwoman Marilyn 
Showalter and Commissioners Richard Hemstad and Patrick Oshie.  
Administrative Law Judge Dennis J. Moss, who was the “agency lead” on the 
project, convened the workshops and also served as primary author of the 
proposed rules. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/7
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rules, which became effective in 2004.15  The WUTC convened two 
rulemaking workshops during the process16 as well as informal 
meetings between the Staff and practitioners who regularly 
appeared before the agency.17  Representatives of companies and 
consumer advocate groups also attended these gatherings,18 
which permitted off-the-record interaction before formally issuing 
the proposed procedural rules for formal comment.  In addition, 
the WUTC addressed ADR and settlement issues in periodic 
“bench and bar” conferences, which facilitated informal exchanges 
between practitioners and agency decision-makers 
(commissioners and ALJs).  These informal discussions included, 
among other topics, the suggestion that at least one settlement 
conference should be scheduled during rate proceedings.19 
B. The Resulting Procedural Rules in Washington 
State 
The revised procedural rules became effective on January 1, 
2004.20  In the process of restructuring the procedural rules, the 
WUTC dedicated a subpart of the procedural rules to ADR.  The 
procedural rules enacted by the WUTC provide an excellent 
model for PUCs to follow in creating a structure within which 
settlement through ADR may occur.  The Washington 
Administrative Code (WAC) provides procedural guidelines for 
the WUTC.21  Chapter 480-07 WAC covers the WUTC’s 
procedural rules, and encompasses general provisions, rule-
making proceedings, adjudicative proceedings, and other 
commission proceedings.  In the adjudicative proceedings 
section,22 the subpart entitled “Alternative Dispute Resolution”23 
 
 15. RULEMAKING, supra note 12.  It is likely the entire process would have 
taken less time but for other pressing business then before the Commission.  
During this time, there were several electric utility rate proceedings associated 
with the impacts of the Western energy crisis being handled by the WUTC. 
 16. GEN. ORDER NO. R-510, supra note 10, at 11 (providing information on 
dates of meetings). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. James Van Nostrand attended the bench-and-bar conferences. 
 20. GEN. ORDER NO. R-510, supra note 10, at 20. 
 21. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-07 (2009). 
 22. Id. §§ 480-07-300 to 07-885. 
 23. Id. §§ 480-07-700 to 07-750. 
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contains definitions of the various forms of ADR encompassed in 
the statute, limitations on authority, the voluntary nature of 
participation, inclusion of parties, confidentiality, procedural 
requirements, the consideration process followed by the 
Commission in review of the outcomes, and separate sections for 
the three main categories of ADR encouraged: mediation, 
collaboratives, and settlement.  The focus of this article is on the 
third process. 
IV.  INFORMAL AGENCY ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE 
SETTLEMENT 
In addition to the formal actions that an agency can take to 
create an environment conducive to settlement, an agency can 
informally incorporate certain practices that will promote 
settlement.  For example, the ALJ assigned to an adjudicative 
proceeding can encourage settlement at the initial pre-hearing 
conference, or scheduling conference, in each adjudicative 
proceeding.  To do this, the ALJ can make a statement regarding 
the availability of a settlement judge to assist the parties in 
pursuing settlement, and can outline the specific steps to be 
followed to invoke that process.  A settlement judge can play an 
instrumental role in assisting the parties to a contested case in 
pursuing settlement.  For example, an experienced judge who is 
well-versed with the agency precedent can provide the parties 
with some glimpse of how their arguments will fare if litigated 
before the PUC. 
The likely outcome in litigating a particular issue is a key 
determinant in shaping a position for purposes of settlement, and 
a settlement judge can be influential in “handicapping” a party’s 
position on a particular issue.  Naturally, the effectiveness of a 
settlement judge depends on the reputation and experience of the 
judge assigned to the case.  A judge who is not deeply familiar 
with the agency’s precedent on a particular issue, or who lacks 
substantial experience with the agency, may not be accorded 
much deference by the parties, and that judge’s “handicapping” of 
a particular issue will be less effective.  Apart from familiarity 
with agency precedent, a settlement judge can bring 
particularized mediation and settlement skills to bear on the 
issues.  Some judges have formal training in ADR, equipping 
them with skills that can be valuable in working with parties 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/7
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whose positions may become polarized through a series of 
contentious proceedings.24 
It is essential that the PUC provide ground rules that will 
preserve the integrity of the settlement process and create an 
environment in which parties can negotiate openly and candidly.  
These ground rules should include a requirement that the 
settlement judge is not the same judge who is presiding over the 
proceeding, and will not otherwise participate in the proceeding.  
The parties participating in a settlement process need to be able 
to offer compromises of their litigation position in candid 
settlement discussions; parties will not do so if there is a chance 
the same judge guiding the settlement discussions will be ruling 
on the issues on which the parties are offering compromises.25  A 
second ground rule encouraging open and candid discussions is 
the stipulation that the substance of the settlement discussions is 
confidential and any statements made in the context of 
settlement discussions will not be admissible or otherwise used 
against a party in any subsequent proceedings.  A party must be 
able to offer a compromise of its litigation position in the interests 
of settlement without fear that any concession will be later used 
against it in a subsequent proceeding.26 
Another informal practice that can promote settlements in 
rate proceedings is the inclusion of a settlement conference as 
part of the procedural schedule. Including a settlement 
conference as an element in the procedural schedule sends a 
strong signal to the parties that the agency wants to provide an 
opportunity for the parties to settle all or some issues without 
 
 24. Id. § 480-07-700(2) (“[t]he Commission may assign commission staff 
trained in ADR principles and techniques to serve as neutral third parties (e.g., 
mediator or facilitator) to assist the parties.”). 
 25. Id. § 480-07-700(4)(e) (“[a]ny mediator, facilitator or settlement judge who 
assists the participants in an ADR process will not participate in any 
adjudication, arbitration, or approval process for the same proceeding, unless all 
parties participate in writing.” (emphasis added)).  
 26.  The Washington rule, for example, provides that “[n]o statement, 
admission, or offer of settlement made during negotiations is admissible in 
evidence in any formal hearing before the commission without the consent of the 
participants or unless necessary to address the process of the negotiations.”  
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-07-700(4)(b) (2009). The Washington rule further 
provides that “[p]arties may agree that information exchanged exclusively 
within the context of settlement negotiation will be treated as confidential.” Id. § 
480-07-700(4)(c).  
11
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resorting to litigation.  Similarly, failure to include a settlement 
conference as part of a procedural schedule suggests the agency is 
interested in having the issues addressed through litigation and 
decided by the agency decision-makers rather than by the parties 
through settlement.  Whether or not a settlement conference is 
included in the formal procedural schedule, parties are free to 
engage in settlement discussions on their own.  However, such ad 
hoc settlement discussions will likely not include all the parties, 
and may exclude some of the issues being raised by some 
intervenor parties.  As a practical matter, settlement discussions 
are much more likely to occur if the agency prescribes a date for 
an initial settlement conference.  By including it as part of the 
procedural schedule, all parties are put on notice and invited to 
attend, which is an essential dynamic of the settlement process, 
as discussed below. 
Experience with three separate utility commissions 
illustrates the different practices with respect to the scheduling of 
settlement conferences.  The Public Utility Commission of Oregon 
(Oregon PUC) had a longstanding practice of including a 
settlement conference as part of the scheduling order in contested 
utility rate proceedings before the agency.  Although not formally 
included as a requirement in the Oregon PUC’s procedural rules, 
within the Office of Administrative Hearings, the presiding ALJ 
specified a date for the parties to convene a settlement conference 
as a matter of practice.  This conference was typically scheduled 
to occur about one month prior to the filing of Staff and 
intervenor testimony in proceedings.  Inclusion in the scheduling 
order had the effect of providing notice to all parties of the 
conference; the Oregon rules provide that notice must be provided 
for any subsequent settlement discussions to ensure that all 
parties have an opportunity to participate.  By including the 
conference at a point in time after parties had a chance to 
complete their discovery on the utility’s direct case and to form 
preliminary positions regarding the issues, the parties were 
generally prepared to engage in substantive settlement 
discussions.  PUC Staff in particular was in a position to identify 
its litigation position on the issues, and to offer settlement 
positions on these issues.  Other parties, too, were expected to 
identify the issues on which they were taking a position and state 
their litigation position on such issues in order to be able to 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/7
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engage in substantive settlement discussions.  This practice 
created an environment which led to the settlement of at least 
some issues, if not all, in many contested utility rate cases. 
A similar practice is followed by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which routinely includes a date 
for an initial settlement conference in the procedural scheduling 
order issued by the presiding ALJ.  As with the Oregon PUC, this 
conference was typically scheduled on a date after FERC trial 
staff and other intervenors had an opportunity to complete their 
discovery on the utility’s direct case, but before opposing 
testimony had been prepared by FERC trial staff and intervenors.  
Prior to the settlement conference, FERC trial staff would 
circulate “top sheets” which summarized the trial staff’s litigation 
position on the issues in the case, and included a recommended 
revenue requirement.  During the settlement conference, FERC 
trial staff would typically offer a settlement position that 
represented a compromise from the litigation position set forth in 
the “top sheets.”  The FERC rules do not expressly provide for the 
inclusion of a settlement conference as part of the procedural 
order; rather, this policy developed as a matter of practice.  Rule 
602 of the FERC Rules of Practice and Procedure27 details the 
process for filing an Offer of Settlement that may arise from the 
settlement conference process. 
Prior to 2001, the WUTC had not established a policy or 
practice of including a settlement conference as part of the 
procedural schedule in contested case proceedings.  The presiding 
ALJ in contested cases would typically advise the parties at the 
pre-hearing conference that they were free to engage in 
settlement discussions among themselves at any time, but the 
practice was not to specify a date for any conference as part of the 
procedural schedule.  During the development of the revised 
procedural rules between June 2001 and December 2003, 
however, the settlement process was the principal subject of at 
least one bench and bar conference at the WUTC, and the 
Commission convened a well-attended workshop in which there 
was extensive discussion about creating a requirement that the 
parties schedule at least one settlement conference during rate 
proceedings.   
 
 27. 18 C.F.R. § 385.602 (2009). 
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The presiding ALJ began to include a discussion about the 
scheduling of an initial settlement meeting during pre-hearing 
conferences. At the outset, the settlement conference began to 
appear in scheduling orders as an informal “advisory” date that 
was not binding upon the parties, and could easily be rescheduled 
or entirely abandoned.  In later proceedings, however, the 
settlement conference began to be included routinely as part of 
the pre-hearing conference order, beginning with a Northwest 
Natural Gas Co. case in 2003.28  Although the revised procedural 
rules adopted in December 2003 did not include a requirement 
that a settlement conference be scheduled in the pre-hearing 
conference order, the standard practice at the WUTC evolved to 
include at least one settlement conference in the order.  
Subsequently, the WUTC’s procedural rule was revised to provide 
that “[t]he commission will set in the procedural schedule for each 
adjudicative proceeding the date for an initial settlement 
conference,” and that conference could be rescheduled only after 
seeking “modification of the schedule by the presiding officer 
upon notice to all other parties.”29 
V.  PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE 
SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
A number of practical considerations come into play with 
respect to whether the settlement process will be successful.  One 
such consideration is the timing of the settlement conference.  At 
what point in the procedural schedule does it make the most 
sense to insert a settlement conference?  A second consideration 
is the standard of review to be applied by the agency in reviewing 
settlements.  How can the agency send a signal through its 
 
 28. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n v. Nw. Natural Gas Co., No. UG-031885, 
Order No. 2, Prehearing Conference Order (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n Jan. 
14, 2004), available at http://www.wutc.wa.gov/rms2.nsf/177d98baa5918c7388 
256a550064a61e/0d04f16ae9c4a39088256e1b0075ed54!OpenDocument (see the 
section entitled “Optional Settlement Discussions”); Kimberly-Clark Tissue Co. 
v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., No. UG-990619, First Supplemental Order on the 
Prehearing Conference (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n July 9, 1999), available 
at http://wutc.wa.gov/webdocs.nsf/b8757c38fe81320e8825707c007f1556/c087a92 
bd09b55b4882567a900567f27!OpenDocument (this is the first Supplemental 
Order on the Prehearing Conference (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 480-09-465-
466 (2009) (the predecessors to the current Subpart D))).  
 29. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-07-700(3)(a) (2009). 
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deliberations and decisions that settlements are encouraged?  A 
third consideration is ensuring that settlements are durable by 
providing an orderly process for their review and action by the 
agency.  What process should the agency follow when it reviews 
settlements to ensure fairness and preserve the integrity of the 
decision-making process?  These considerations are discussed 
briefly in the following sections. 
A. Timing of the Settlement Conference 
The schedule in a typical utility general rate proceeding 
presents a dynamic shifting of workload as the parties work 
through the milestones in the schedule.  In the analogy of a 
tennis ball during a tennis match, the ball—the obligation to take 
the initiative in the rate case process—may bounce from the court 
of the utility, to the court of Staff and intervenors and back to the 
utility during the course of processing the rate case filing.  In the 
first several months following the utility’s filing of its initial case 
and direct testimony, the ball is in the court of Staff and 
intervenors.  These parties have the burden of conducting 
discovery on that case and identifying the issues that they wish to 
explore and challenge.  The utility responds to discovery requests 
propounded by the opposing parties, but the bulk of the obligation 
to proceed during this time is placed in the hands of Staff and 
intervenors.  Following the filing of the opposing testimony by 
Staff and intervenors, the ball moves to the utility’s side of the 
court; it must conduct discovery on the testimony submitted by 
Staff and intervenors, and then prepare rebuttal testimony 
during what is typically only a short period of time.  After the 
filing of the utility’s rebuttal testimony, the ball moves back to 
the Staff and intervenor side of the court, and they must read, 
process, and understand the utility’s rebuttal positions and have 
a brief opportunity to conduct discovery on that case.  In the 
weeks immediately preceding the evidentiary hearings, it is 
probably accurate to say that the ball is in neither court, as both 
sides are busy in their preparations for the evidentiary hearing. 
Understanding this dynamic is essential to discussing the 
issue of the opportune time in which to schedule a settlement 
conference.  Depending upon the point in the process which the 
settlement conference is scheduled, the parties will likely differ in 
their positions on the desirability of a settlement conference, and 
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their ability to prepare for and staff it adequately and 
competently.  From the perspective of Staff and intervenors, the 
utility is in the strongest position throughout the case.  The 
utility had months to prepare its filing, had the ability to choose 
to make the filing at a strategic time to the utility’s advantage, 
and possesses all the information and data that the other parties 
need in order both to understand the utility’s case and to support 
the positions or arguments to be advanced by Staff and 
intervenors in their opposing testimony.  For the opposing 
parties, the months immediately following the utility’s filing are 
very important to conduct the necessary discovery and to prepare 
the opposing cases.  The ball is clearly in their court, and Staff 
and intervenors can be expected to oppose the scheduling of a 
settlement conference during the valuable period prior to the 
filing of the Staff and intervenor testimony. 
Similarly, when the ball moves to the utility’s court for the 
preparation and filing of rebuttal testimony, the utility is hard-
pressed to be able to accommodate a settlement conference.  
During a limited period of three to four weeks, the utility must 
conduct discovery on the opposing testimony, and prepare the 
rebuttal testimony necessary to address and respond to the 
dozens of issues raised by Staff and intervenors in their opposing 
testimony.  At the end of the day, the utility has the burden of 
proof to sustain its request for rate relief.  Its rebuttal case is 
essential to sustaining that burden, so the utility is not likely  to 
favor the suggestion that a settlement conference be scheduled 
during this stage. 
Once the rebuttal testimony is filed, Staff and the 
intervenors have a limited time to conduct discovery on the 
rebuttal testimony prior to the evidentiary hearings.  For the 
most part, all the parties are heavily involved in extensive 
preparations for the evidentiary hearings which involve 
preparing witnesses, compiling exhibits to be included in the 
record, and last-minute fine tuning of each party’s respective 
presentation.  This period may provide an opportune time for 
settlement discussions that is least prejudicial to either side.  
However, as discussed below, settlement at this stage in the 
proceeding provides the least opportunity for avoiding effort and 
expense and capturing the intangible benefits of resolving 
disputes through settlement. 
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From the lead author’s perspective, the most opportune time 
to schedule a settlement conference in a utility rate proceeding is 
three to four weeks prior to the filing of Staff and intervenor 
testimony.30 A number of considerations support this 
recommendation.  First, scheduling the settlement conference at 
this time—which typically would be several months after the 
utility has filed its direct case—permits the opposing parties to 
complete their discovery on the utility’s direct case and develop 
preliminary positions on the issues in the utility’s case that will 
be challenged.  By this time, these parties will have retained their 
expert witnesses to advise them on the complex issues and will 
also have outlined their positions on the issues that will be taken 
in opposing testimony.  Second, it is likely these parties will not 
have spent much time actually drafting the pre-filed testimony 
that they will submit.  In other words, enough work will have 
been done to identify the issues and develop positions, but a lot of 
the effort and expense associated with fully developing the 
position and explaining it in written testimony will not have been 
expended. 
Third, it is this effort in developing and refining testimony 
that tends to motivate a litigant and harden its litigation 
position.  In other words, the litigant starts to believe in its case 
more as the case is articulated and strengthened through the 
preparation of pre-filed testimony.  What may start out as a 
preliminary soft position taken for negotiating purposes starts to 
strengthen in the eyes of the litigant upon repetition and 
refinement throughout the testimony drafting process.  It 
becomes more difficult for a party to compromise that position 
through settlement once it has been put into writing.   
Fourth, at this stage of the proceeding, nothing will have 
been filed with the PUC with respect to the positions of Staff and 
intervenors on the merits of the utility’s case.  Once the opposing 
testimony is filed, the positions become a matter of public record, 
and it becomes much more difficult for a party to retreat from its 
 
 30. It should be noted that while in private practice for twenty-two years 
with private law firms in the Pacific Northwest, the author, Mr. Van Nostrand, 
primarily represented the side of investor-owned utilities in general rate 
proceedings and, thus, as a matter of strategy, would tend to favor a tactic that 
would schedule a settlement conference during a period in the procedural 
schedule when the workload burden was on Staff and intervenors. 
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litigation position.  This is particularly true when opposing 
parties issue press releases setting forth their position in rate 
cases to assure their constituency that they are fulfilling their 
duty in protecting their respective interests.  Once these 
litigation positions have been shared with the public, these 
parties will have the difficulty of explaining why they may have 
settled for something far less extreme in an all-party settlement 
in later pronouncements, creating another disincentive for 
settling. 
Finally, settling at this stage of the proceeding may allow the 
settlement to take effect before the end of the statutory 
suspension period.  Inasmuch as the utility is always interested 
in obtaining rate relief sooner rather than later, the timing of the 
rate relief is often used as a bargaining chip.    The utility can be 
expected to compromise on issues in exchange for rate relief that 
is effective earlier as a result of a partial or complete settlement.  
Moreover, there could be other elements of the case that benefit 
the public through earlier implementation. 
Pursuing settlement at this point in the procedural schedule 
provides the most potential for avoiding litigation expenses.  Staff 
will not have to devote the time of its lawyers, engineers, 
accountants, and economists to preparing testimony and exhibits.  
Both Staff and intervenors will avoid the expense associated with 
the time of their expert witnesses in preparing testimony.  To the 
extent intervenors rely on outside counsel for representation in 
the proceeding, the fees associated with their preparation of 
testimony, and participating in the later stages of the proceeding 
can be avoided or substantially reduced.  From the utility’s 
perspective, if the case can be settled prior to the filing of 
opposing testimony, the utility will avoid the costs of the 
associated discovery, preparation of rebuttal testimony (including 
the accompanying expert witness fees), and the extensive costs 
associated with litigating all the issues in the hearing room 
(witness preparation costs, lawyers preparing cross-examination 
of opposing witnesses and drafting post-hearing briefs).  If the 
utility relies on outside counsel for representation, the associated 
legal fees can be reduced dramatically through settlement given 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/7
VAN NOSTRAND & HONAKER  
2009-10] PRESERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 245 
the end-loading of legal work in a typical rate case proceeding.31  
In addition to the tangible savings achieved through reduction of 
litigation expenses, settlement at this stage is the most likely to 
lead to furthering productive, cooperative relationships among 
the settling parties.  The litigation positions will not have 
hardened, and the need to preserve a litigation position for 
purposes of public consumption will not have materialized. 
Other points in the procedural schedule also present 
opportunities for settlement, but, in the lead author’s view, 
settlement at other times does not present the same advantages 
for avoidance of litigation expenses and maximizing the 
intangible benefits of settlement.  Another opportunity for 
settlement logically occurs immediately after the filing of the 
Staff and intervenor testimony.  At this point, the official 
litigation positions of all the parties are known, and these 
litigation positions provide a logical boundary for substantive 
settlement discussions.  Moreover, the positions of Staff and 
intervenors will be fully developed and probably capable of being 
explored more thoroughly.  However, Staff and intervenors will 
have incurred the expenses and effort associated with drafting, 
refining, and filing the pre-filed testimony and exhibits, and the 
appeal of minimizing costs through early settlement is lost.  As 
previously noted, completing this process is likely to harden the 
positions of Staff and intervenors, making settlement less likely. 
An additional opportunity for settlement arises just prior to 
the hearing, after the utility has filed its rebuttal testimony.  An 
advantage of convening a settlement conference at this point is 
that the utility may have softened its opening position in 
response to the opposing testimony, and may have elected to 
abandon pursuit of certain issues.  In other words, a logical 
narrowing of the issues may have occurred, and the parameters 
for pursuing settlement may similarly be narrower.  However, 
pursuing settlement at this point in the procedural schedule is 
not ideal inasmuch as the utility will have incurred the expenses 
associated with conducting discovery on the opposing testimony, 
preparing rebuttal testimony, and engaging additional expert 
 
 31. The work of counsel during a rate case occurs primarily towards the end 
of a general rate proceeding, when the lawyer is preparing for hearings, 
assisting in preparing the utility witnesses to testify, drafting cross-examination 
of the opposing testimony, and drafting post-hearing briefs. 
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witnesses (as necessary) to supplement the utility’s rebuttal case.  
In addition to the cost, this process is likely to have hardened the 
utility’s position against settlement, as the utility has been forced 
to defend itself against a likely multitude of serious allegations, 
including imprudence, mismanagement, and disregard for the 
customers’ welfare.  The only costs that can be avoided at this 
point are those associated with hearing preparations and post-
hearing briefing. 
B. Standard of Review for Evaluating Proposed 
Settlements 
An agency can also set a tone that encourages settlements by 
the standard of review it applies when reviewing a settlement.  
The opportunity to set this tone typically comes into play in two 
contexts: (1) the questions asked from the bench in settlement 
hearings; and (2) the analysis of the settlement in the agency’s 
order when it rules on the settlement by either adopting or 
rejecting it. 
Typically, settlements are presented to the decision-makers 
in a settlement hearing where testimony is offered by the settling 
parties in support of the settlement, and any opposing parties 
have an opportunity to offer testimony against the settlement.  
The hearings officer and the commissioners will have an 
opportunity to question the witnesses about the terms of the 
settlement.  In utility rate proceedings, the settling parties will 
invariably settle certain issues on different terms than how the 
issues may have been resolved by the decision-makers in a non-
settled outcome.  It is a necessary part of the give-and-take of 
settlement negotiations that an outcome on one issue may have 
an indirect impact on the resolution of another issue.  For 
example, what may seem to be an unfavorable outcome for utility 
customers on one particular issue may be explained by a 
favorable outcome for customers on another issue.  The parties to 
settlement negotiations have different priorities regarding what 
they hope to achieve in settlement and in order to achieve a 
consensus, these competing interests must be accommodated.  
Although the overall result may be reasonable, the settled 
outcome of individual issues may be difficult to explain and 
justify. 
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By according substantial deference to the settling parties, an 
agency sets a tone that encourages settlement.  In order to satisfy 
their statutory requirement (in the case of setting utility rates, 
ensuring that the resulting rates are just, fair, reasonable and 
sufficient),32 the decision-makers will have to ensure that the 
overall outcome of the settlement is reasonable.  It may be unwise 
to probe the parties extensively about how the resolution of a 
particular issue was reached.  Some issues may have been hotly 
contested in the settlement negotiations, and the final resolution 
represents a fragile compromise of a number of parties’ competing 
positions.  Extensive questioning from the bench runs the risk of 
upsetting that delicate balance, because when pressed,  parties 
tend to fall back on their litigation positions.  An explanation may 
also lead to an unhelpful discussion of the interplay of how the 
various issues were resolved to accommodate the settling parties’ 
competing interests.  Although the decision-makers need to get 
some idea of the parties’ competing positions in order to satisfy 
themselves that the issues were thoroughly explored and the 
overall settlement is reasonable, extensive questioning and 
skepticism about the terms of a settlement may send a message 
that discourages settlements. 
The second opportunity for the agency to set a tone that 
encourages settlement is in its orders, which accept or reject 
settlements.  For example, the agency can enunciate a standard 
of review that grants considerable deference to the settling 
parties in fashioning the terms of a settlement proposal (subject 
to the agency’s statutory authority to ensure that the overall end 
result is reasonable and produces just, fair, reasonable, and 
sufficient rates).  In this regard, the WUTC in recent years has 
consistently followed a standard of review that encourages 
settlements.  The Commission follows a three-part inquiry in 
examining the individual components of a settlement agreement: 
(1) whether any aspect of the proposal is contrary to law; (2) 
whether any aspect of the proposal offends public policy; and (3) 
whether the evidence supports the proposed elements of the 
settlement agreement as a reasonable solution of the issues at 
hand.33  The first two elements of this three-part inquiry set a 
 
 32. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.28.010(1) (2009). 
 33. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n v. PacifiCorp, No. UG-032065, Order No. 
06, Approving & Adopting Settlement Agreement Subject to Conditions; 
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rather low threshold for approval of a settlement; rarely would 
settling parties propose a solution that violates the law or offends 
public policy.  With respect to the third element, as previously 
noted, settling parties are required under the WUTC’s rules to 
file testimony in support of a settlement proposal that provides a 
sufficient basis in the evidentiary record for approving the 
settlement.34  This is also a relatively easy and straight-forward 
requirement to satisfy. 
Apart from enunciating this particular standard of review, 
the WUTC’s precedent includes other rulings that tend to 
encourage settlement.  In one case, for example, non-settling 
parties opposed a proposed settlement on the grounds that it was 
a black box settlement.  The settling parties proposed an overall 
revenue requirement without itemizing how many of the 
individual contested issues were resolved.  As previously 
discussed, utility rate proceedings typically involve dozens of 
issues, and intervenors may propose numerous adjustments to 
the utility’s requested revenue requirement in addition to the 
adjustments that are included in the Staff’s case.  In this 
particular case, the non-settling parties were basing their case for 
opposing the settlement on the failure of the settlement 
agreement to address or include the various adjustments offered 
by the non-settling parties.  The WUTC observed that it was clear 
from the settlement agreement and from the testimony at the 
settlement hearing that “the settling parties were mindful of, and 
did not take into account the adjustments proposed by all 
parties.”35 
 
Rejecting Tariff Sheets; Authorizing & Requiring Compliance Filing (Wash. Util. 
Transp. Comm’n, Oct 27, 2004) [hereinafter PacifiCorp], available at 
http://www.wutc.wa.gov/rms2.nsf/177d98baa5918c7388256a550064a61e/aa24c0
9c6ba9277088256f3a007f67c1!OpenDocument. 
 34. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-07-740(2) (2009) (requires the settling parties 
to “file supporting documentation sufficient to demonstrate to the commission 
that the proposal is consistent with law and the public interest and that it is 
appropriate for adoption”). This documentation typically includes a narrative 
statement, which outlines “the scope of the underlying dispute; the scope of the 
settlement and its principal aspects; a statement of parties’ views about why the 
proposal satisfies both their interests and the public interest; and a summary of 
legal points that bear on the proposed settlement.” Id. § 480-07-740(2)(a). The 
documentation also includes testimony in support of the settlement and 
“sufficient evidence to support its adoption under the standards that apply to its 
acceptance.” Id. § 480-07-740(2)(b).  
 35. PacifiCorp, supra note 33, at 26. 
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In rejecting this argument, the WUTC stated that “[t]his 
implied criticism ignores the fact that all settlements have a so-
called black box quality to one degree or another—they are by 
nature compromises of more extreme positions that are supported 
by evidence and advocacy.”36  The WUTC in its order also noted 
the disclaimer frequently included in settlement agreements 
whereby the settling parties stipulate that their execution of the 
settlement agreement does not evince their approval of particular 
facts, principles, methods, or theories employed in arriving at the 
settlement terms.37  The WUTC concluded that “close scrutiny of 
the individual adjustments is not required . . . except to the 
extent they help us understand the compromise nature of the 
parties’ agreement to an overall revenue requirement, and to give 
us insight into things the settling parties considered in arriving 
at their compromise.”38 
Upon presentation of a settlement proposal to the WUTC, the 
focus turns to the reasonableness of that settlement and whether 
the terms of that proposed settlement meet “all pertinent legal 
and policy standards.”39  The WUTC’s “overarching concern . . . is 
with the end results produced under the settlement,” in 
accordance with the “end results” test enunciated in Federal 
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company.40  It will not 
be sufficient for parties opposing the settlement to claim that a 
settlement is deficient insofar as it fails to address the various 
 
 36. Id. at 27.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., No. PG-
060215, Order No. 02, Final Order Accepting Agreement on Condition 7 (Wash. 
Util. & Transp. Comm’n Apr. 3, 2008). available at http://www.wutc.wa.gov/rms 
2.nsf/177d98baa5918c7388256a550064a61e/b2a40f5879d11a198825742000677c
5f!OpenDocument. 
 40.  PacifiCorp, supra note 33, at 20; see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope 
Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (discussing the “end results” test). The 
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following with respect to the standard of judicial 
review of rate proceedings for setting “just and reasonable rates” under the 
Natural Gas Act: 
 
It is not the theory but the impact of the rate order which counts.  If 
the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable, 
judicial inquiry . . . is at an end.  The fact that the method employed 
to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important.  
Id. at 602.  
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adjustments or arguments proposed by the non-settling parties.  
As stated by the WUTC in one decision,  
 
[While the non-settling parties] would have us make 
different adjustments, or assign different values to certain 
of the adjustments made in the Settlement Agreement, we 
are confident in our judgment, made on the basis of the 
record before us, that the overall result in terms of revenue 
requirement is reasonable and well supported by the 
evidence.41   
 
In reaching this result, the WUTC observed that “[r]atemaking is 
not an exact science,”42 and that “[t]he economic judgments 
required in rate proceedings are often hopelessly complex and do 
not admit of a single correct result.”43 
This deferential standard in reviewing settlements creates an 
environment that should promote settlements in contested case 
rate proceedings.  The WUTC’s reference to the Hope Natural 
Gas standard reinforces the point that the range of 
reasonableness within which a settlement, or even a PUC 
determined outcome may fall is indeed somewhat broad.  This 
standard puts the settlement process in the context of a 
ratemaking process in which there is no single, correct result.  
While a proposed settlement may resolve an issue differently 
than how the decision-makers may have resolved it in a contested 
case, the “end results” standard accommodates a range of possible 
outcomes, and provides a fairly wide comfort zone within which 
decision-makers can be confident in accepting a proposed 
settlement. 
 
41. PacifiCorp, supra note 33, at 27.  
42. Id. 
43. Id. (citing U.S. West v. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n, 949 P.2d 1321, 
(1997) (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989)). See 
also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 278 (1976) (“[T]here is 
no single cost-recovering rate, but a zone of reasonableness: “Statutory 
reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a 
pinpoint.  It allows a substantial spread between what is unreasonable because 
too low and what is unreasonable because too high.”” (citing Montana-Dakota 
Util. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951))).  
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C. An Orderly Process for Agency Consideration of 
Settlements 
Another aspect of encouraging settlements is to provide an 
orderly process to ensure that agency decisions approving a 
settlement are durable and will withstand judicial review in the 
event a non-settling party (or other party adversely affected by 
the decision) appeals the decision.  An orderly process also 
promotes administrative efficiency and confidence in the integrity 
of the agency’s decision-making process. 
Three elements are essential to establishing an orderly 
process for agency consideration of settlements.  First, the agency 
should provide a process for gathering information about the 
settlement and allowing parties to comment on the settlement, 
preferably by convening a settlement hearing.  Second, the 
agency must ensure that a sufficient evidentiary record is 
developed to support the agency’s decision in the event the 
settlement is adopted.  Third, the agency must be mindful of the 
due process rights of the non-settling parties, and afford them a 
reasonable opportunity to present a case in opposition to the 
settlement. 
The decision-makers must be provided with the necessary 
information to allow them to understand the settlement terms 
and to reach a judgment about the reasonableness of a proposed 
settlement.  This information is typically included in the 
documentation that is filed to support the settlement.  In 
Washington, for example, the WUTC’s rules require that a 
proposed settlement agreement be accompanied by “supporting 
documentation sufficient to demonstrate to the commission that 
the proposal is consistent with law and the public interest and 
that it is appropriate for adoption.”44  This documentation must 
include a narrative statement which essentially provides the 
background information regarding the issues in dispute, and an 
explanation of the terms of the proposed settlement.45  Another 
 
 44. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-07-740(2) (2009). 
 45. Id. § 480-07-740(2)(a).  This section states that:  
 
[s]upporting documentation should include a narrative outlining the 
scope of the underlying dispute; the scope of the settlement and its 
principal aspects; a statement of parties’ views about why the proposal 
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means of gaining the necessary understanding about the terms of 
a proposed settlement is to convene a settlement hearing, where 
the decision-makers have an opportunity to ask questions of the 
settling parties.  On this point, Washington’s rules state that 
“[e]ach party to a settlement agreement must offer to present one 
or more witnesses to testify in support of the proposal and answer 
questions concerning the settlement agreement’s details, and its 
costs and benefits.”46  As discussed above, the settlement hearing 
provides an opportunity for the decision-makers to set a tone with 
respect to their policy towards settlement. 
An agency decision—including the adoption of a settlement 
agreement—must be supported by substantial evidence.  The 
durability of settlements thus requires that a sufficient 
evidentiary record be developed to support an agency’s decision to 
adopt a settlement.  The information described in the preceding 
paragraph—the narrative statement and the transcript from 
testimony at the settlement hearing—would help satisfy this 
evidentiary requirement.  Counsel for the settling parties must 
ensure that the substantial evidence standard is met.  On this 
point, the Washington rule requires that “[p]roponents of a 
proposed settlement . . . present sufficient evidence to support its 
adoption under the standards that apply to its acceptance.”47  As 
previously noted, that standard requires that the settlement be 
lawful, consistent with the public interest, and “supported by an 
appropriate record.”48 
An integral requirement in agency consideration of a 
settlement is the right of non-settling parties to have an 
opportunity to challenge the settlement.  An agency’s interest in 
promoting settlement should not be at the expense of the 
integrity of the decision-making process; parties declining to join 
in a settlement should, as a matter of fairness, be provided an 
opportunity to make their case in opposition to the settlement.  
While it may be argued that these rights must be accorded as a 
matter of due process, some courts have found that because 
ratemaking is a legislative function, procedural requirements are 
 
satisfies both their interests and the public interest; and a summary of 
legal points that bear on the proposed settlement. 
 
 46. Id. § 480-07-740(2)(b).  
 47. Id. § 480-07-740(2)(b).  
 48. Id. § 480-07-750(1). 
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not imposed on ratemaking decisions.49  Nonetheless, the 
decision-making process is likely enhanced by affording non-
settling parties an opportunity to challenge the settlement, as it 
allows the terms of the settlement to be tested by the rigors of the 
adversarial process.  A meaningful opportunity to challenge a 
settlement likely consists of the following elements: (1) the right 
to present argument and evidence in opposition to the settlement 
proposal; and (2) the right to cross-examine witnesses supporting 
the proposal.  The non-settling parties could also be provided with 
an opportunity to present an alternative, preferred outcome 
advocated by the non-settling parties.  Given that the focus of the 
process is on the reasonableness of the settlement proposal being 
considered by the decision-makers, such an alternative proposal 
should be considered as an offer of proof rather than a competing 
proposal. In addition, at the decision-makers’ discretion, and 
depending upon the complexity of the settlement proposal, the 
non-settling parties could be provided with an opportunity to 
conduct discovery on the terms of the proposed settlement.50 
 
 49. In Attorney General’s Office, Public Counsel Section v. Wash. Util. & 
Transp. Comm’n, two non-settling parties to a WUTC rate proceeding claimed 
their due process rights were violated by the process followed by the WUTC.  
Wash. Attorney Gen. Office v. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n, 116 P.3d 1064 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005). The Washington Court of Appeals ruled that “[t]he 
function of ratemaking is legislative in character,” and “[i]n reviewing 
ratemaking decisions of legislative bodies,” the Washington courts “have looked 
only to whether the rates were fair (i.e., reasonable, non-discriminatory, not 
arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at 1071. As a result, because the Commission’s 
ratemaking is a legislative act, the “only due process right is in non-arbitrary 
rates.” Id.  
 50. The governing rule in Washington is provides that: 
 
Parties opposed to the commission’s adoption of a proposed settlement 
retain the following rights:  The right to cross-examine witnesses 
supporting the proposal; the right to present evidence opposing the 
proposal; the right to present argument in opposition to the proposal; 
and the right to present evidence, or in the commission’s discretion, an 
offer of proof, in support of the party’s preferred result.  The presiding 
officer may allow discovery on the proposed settlement in the presiding 
officer’s discretion. 
 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480-07-740(2)(c) (2009). 
27
VAN NOSTRAND & HONAKER  
254 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
VI.  BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although the focus of this article concerns settlement in 
retail utility rate proceedings, many of the concepts can be 
applied more broadly to agencies other than PUCs.  Any agency 
seeking to encourage settlement of contested case proceedings 
will need to take a combination of formal and informal measures 
to achieve that objective.  With respect to formal actions, the 
agency’s procedural rules must address ADR and identify various 
options available for resolving disputes other than litigating 
them, including mediation, collaboration, settlement conferences, 
or any combination of these processes.  Ideally, the agency’s 
procedural rules will devote an entire chapter to ADR, so that 
parties can easily ascertain the options available to them and can 
gain some understanding of the elements of each ADR technique.  
Formal ADR rules provide a necessary foundation for an agency 
to create an environment in which negotiated settlements are 
encouraged. 
Apart from the formal incorporation of ADR through the 
rulemaking process, an agency can promote settlement through 
its adjudication process.  How an agency conducts settlement 
hearings and the standard of review it applies in evaluating 
settlement proposals can send a very strong signal about the 
agency’s attitude toward resolving disputes through settlement.  
Another effective means of encouraging settlement is the 
inclusion of a settlement conference in the procedural schedule of 
each contested case proceeding.  Such a measure has the effect of 
not only specifying a milestone for purposes of parties’ processing 
of the case, but also removes any potential stigma associated with 
an individual party making the first move towards suggesting 
settlement rather than litigation.  It is also likely to result in 
participation by all parties to the proceeding, and is preferable to 
the ad hoc settlement discussions that may occur among only 
some parties in the absence of a formally scheduled settlement 
conference.  The opportune time to schedule a settlement 
conference during the course of the proceedings will vary 
depending upon the nature of the proceeding.  In the case of retail 
utility rate cases, the recommendation in this article is to 
schedule a settlement conference three to four weeks prior to the 
filing of Staff and intervenor testimony.  More broadly, once a 
proceeding has progressed to the point that the parties have had 
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an opportunity to conduct sufficient discovery to inform their 
cases and to develop preliminary positions on the issues, the 
driving factors in setting a strategic date for a settlement 
conference are: (1) avoiding the effort and expense  through early 
settlement of the issues; and (2) preventing the hardening of 
positions that can occur through more complete development of a 
litigant’s case. 
An agency must also implement an orderly process for 
consideration of settlements which promotes confidence in the 
integrity of the decision-making process and also increases the 
likelihood that agency decisions approving a settlement are 
durable.  An agency should develop a process that is fair to all 
litigants—both settling and non-settling parties—and ensures 
that sufficient evidence is provided to the decision-makers to 
enable an informed decision, and to satisfy the statutory legal 
standard to support the decision on judicial review. 
Given the substantial benefits that can potentially be 
achieved through reducing litigation and administrative costs, 
agencies should strongly consider whether they are doing 
enough—through both their formal rules and their informal 
practices and policies—to promote ADR in resolving contested 
case proceedings.  Apart from reducing the time and expense 
associated with a fully litigated case, early settlement of all or 
some of the issues minimizes uncertainty inasmuch as the 
involved parties are able to fashion a thorough and informed 
resolution of an issue rather than leave it in the hands of the 
agency decision-makers.  Moreover, the process of achieving an 
outcome through settlement rather than through litigation can 
result in improved relationships among the parties. The 
recommendations and insights offered in this article should 
provide some helpful guidance to administrative agencies seeking 
to encourage settlement of their contested case proceedings. 
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